Just what is obvious or not is a question that has provoked substantial litigation in the Federal Circuit, the appellate court with special jurisdiction over patent law disputes. Under U.S. patent law, an inventor may not obtain a patent, which protects his invention from infringement by others, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that "the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill" in the patent's subject matter area \[[@R1]\]. However, what was "obvious" at the time of invention to a person of ordinary skill is hardly clear and is, in effect, a legal fiction designed to approximate objectivity. As illustrated by Chief Justice John Roberts of the Supreme Court in a moment of levity, "Who do you get to \... tell you something's not obvious ... the least insightful person you can find?" \[[@R2]\] Despite the apparent objectivity provided by a "person of ordinary skill" obviousness standard, the difficulty lies in that such a standard is still susceptible to multiple interpretations, depending on the point of view and knowledge ascribed to the "ordinary person." As such, how obviousness is defined and interpreted by the courts will have important implications on biotechnology patents and the biotechnology business.

The issue of obviousness arose in April 2007 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* \[[@R3]\] The facts of the case were anything but glamorous; in the suit, Teleflex, a manufacturer of adjustable pedal systems for automobiles, sued KSR, its rival, for infringement of its patent, which "describe\[d\] a mechanism for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so that the pedal's position can be transmitted to a computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle's engine." \[[@R4]\] Teleflex believed that KSR's new pedal design was too similar to its own patented design and therefore infringed upon it \[[@R5]\]. In defense, KSR argued that Teleflex's patent was merely the obvious combination of two pre-existing elements and, thus, the patent, upon which Teleflex's infringement claim was based, was invalid.

Patent law relies on the concept of obviousness to distinguish whether new inventions are worthy of being protected by a patent. If a new invention is too obvious, it is not granted a patent and is therefore not a legally protected property interest. However, if an invention is deemed not obvious and has met the other patentability requirements, a patent will be granted, thereby conferring exclusive use of the invention to the patent holder. This exclusive right prohibits others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States the patented invention \[[@R6]\]. Essentially, the definition of obviousness sets the balance between rewarding new inventions with exclusive property rights and respecting old inventions by not treating minor variations of existing patents as new patents. In this manner, the law seeks to provide economic incentives for the creation of new inventions by ensuring that the property right conferred by the patent will be protected against insignificant variations. The importance of where the line for obviousness is drawn and how clearly it is drawn is especially important in the biotechnology industry. Studies have shown that the development of a new pharmaceutical therapy can take up to 14 years with costs exceeding \$800 million \[[@R7]\]. Such an enormous investment of time and money would not be practical if it did not predictably result in a legally enforceable property right.

The standard for what constitutes a patentable discovery has evolved over the last 150 years. In 1851, the Supreme Court held in *Hotchkiss v. Greenwood* that a patentable discovery required a level of ingenuity above that possessed by an ordinary person \[[@R8]\]. Lower courts treated the *Hotchkiss* standard as a subjective standard, whereby courts sought to determine "what constitute\[d\] an invention" \[[@R9]\] and a "flash of creative genius" \[[@R10]\]. However, the attempts at imposing the *Hotchkiss* standard proved unworkable, and in 1952, Congress overrode the case law with the Patent Act, "mandat\[ing\] that patentability be governed by an objective nonobviousness standard." \[[@R11]\] This new statutory standard moved the courts away from subjective determinations and toward a more workable, objective obviousness standard.

While the Patent Act laid the foundation for the current obviousness standard, the Supreme Court in *Graham v. John Deere Co.* interpreted the statutory language in an attempt to provide greater clarity as to what exactly "obvious" meant \[[@R12]\]. The Supreme Court determined that the objective analysis would require "the scope and content of the prior art \... to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue \... to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved." \[[@R13]\] In addition to analysis under this three-part framework, the Supreme Court called for several secondary considerations to be weighed, including "commercial success, long felt but unresolved needs, \[and the\] failure of others \[to solve the problem addressed\]." \[[@R13]\]

Unsurprisingly, lower courts were unsatisfied with the Supreme Court's attempts to clarify the obviousness standard and sought to provide "more uniformity and consistency" to their evaluation of obviousness than the Supreme Court's jumble of factors provided \[[@R14]\]. In search of consistency, the Federal Circuit created the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test (TSM test) "under which a patent is only proved obvious if 'some motivation or suggestion to combine prior art teachings' can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art." \[[@R14]\] Through implementation of the TSM test, the Federal Circuit sought to maintain the flexibility envisioned by the Supreme Court in *Graham*, while at the same time providing more certainty and predictability to obviousness determinations.

The issue before the Supreme Court in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* was whether the Federal Circuit's elaboration on the statutory language of the Patent Act, the TSM test, was consistent with the terms of the Patent Act itself and the Supreme Court's own analysis in *Graham*. The Supreme Court determined that while the TSM test was, on its terms, consistent with the framework set out in *Graham*, the rigid manner in which the Federal Circuit had taken to applying that standard was inconsistent with the flexible approach established by *Graham* \[[@R15]\]. More generally, it appears the Supreme Court was mainly interested in restoring a more rounded, thorough inquiry to the evaluation of obviousness: "*Graham* set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at *any* secondary considerations that would prove instructive." \[[@R16]\] As stated by the Supreme Court, "\[r\]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it." \[[@R17]\] As such, the Supreme Court reversed the findings of the Federal Circuit, which had found the Teleflex patent valid, and remanded the case back to the lower court with directions to analyze, without rigid adherence to the TSM test, whether the Teleflex patent was obvious \[[@R18]\].

The Supreme Court's ruling in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* that the Federal Circuit apply its TSM test less rigidly may have implications for those seeking biotechnology patents in the future. As discussed above, the large investments necessary to develop a marketable biotechnology product demand that entrepreneurs making those investments be reasonably assured that they can predict any future legal hurdles in patenting their invention and in ultimately protecting their patent. As explained by the Biotechnology Industry Organization in its *amicus curiae* brief in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, "\[i\]nvestment thus is predicated on an expected return on investment in the form of products or services that are protected by patents whose validity can be fairly determined." \[[@R19]\] Therefore, the Supreme Court's insistence that the Federal Circuit no longer rigidly rely on the TSM test could increase uncertainty in the grant of future patents. However, the Supreme Court's refusal to completely dismiss the TSM test, while in fact endorsing its continued use, albeit on a less rigid basis, has to be viewed as a profound victory for an industry with a significant stake in maintaining the status quo. Moreover, it is unclear how much the Supreme Court's holding in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* will truly change the legal analysis of the lower courts, given the evidence that lower courts already were independently shifting away from rigid adherence to the TSM test before the Supreme Court's ruling \[[@R20]\].

More importantly, several aspects of the Supreme Court's reasoning in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* seem to directly address relevant concerns of the biotechnology market in favorable ways. First, the Supreme Court made clear that though a product is the result of a combination of elements that were "obvious to try," it is not necessarily "obvious" under the Patent Act. Retaining the possibility that "obvious to try" inventions still may be patentable is extremely important to the biotechnology industry in particular because "many patentable inventions in biotechnology spring from known components and methodologies found in \[the\] prior art." \[[@R21]\] Rather than foreclosing all "obvious to try" inventions as being obvious, and therefore not patentable, the Supreme Court instead explained that where there is "a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions," it is more likely that a person of ordinary skill would find it obvious to pursue "known options." \[[@R22]\] Thus, the proper inquiry, as stated by the Supreme Court, is "whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions." \[[@R23]\] While this reasoning may prevent some "obvious to try" inventions from being patented, it is unlikely to have a substantial effect on inventions in the biotechnology market because "most advances in biotechnology are only won through great effort and expense, and with only a low probability of success in achieving the claimed invention at the outset." \[[@R24]\] In other words, it would be hard to characterize the use of prior art in the biotechnology context as predictable based on the inherent unpredictability of obtaining favorable results. As such, most biotechnology inventions would presumably fall outside the Supreme Court's "obvious to try" reasoning due to the very nature of the industry, meaning they would remain patentable under the Supreme Court's *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* decision.

Second, the Supreme Court recognized the "distortion caused by hindsight bias" and the importance of avoiding "arguments reliant upon *ex post* reasoning," though it lessened the Federal Circuit's rigid protection against hindsight bias \[[@R24]\]. Hindsight bias requires that obviousness be viewed at the time the invention was made, because what may seem revolutionary at the time of invention may, upon the passage of time, seem "obvious." Cognizance of hindsight bias is crucial for biotechnology patents because "there often is a long 'passage of time between patent application filing and litigation with biotechnology inventions \[that\] can exacerbate the problem' of hindsight bias." \[[@R25]\] The problem is further exacerbated by the "significantly longer durations of commercial utility" biotechnology inventions enjoy as compared to those in other fields \[[@R25]\]. The more time between the filing of a patent and the subsequent litigation over its validity, the greater the risk that "reliable accounts of \[the\] context" in which the discovery is made will no longer exist \[[@R26]\]. As such, inventions that were not obvious when they were created will be inescapably colored by the passage of time and by new knowledge and discoveries; the likelihood of this occurrence is higher the further removed the litigation is from the patent filing date. Once again, however, it seems clear that despite the Supreme Court's abandonment of the TSM test's rigidity, strong protections against hindsight bias still were emphasized in the Supreme Court's *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* decision. In fact, lower courts applying *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* acknowledge they are "cautious" to avoid "using hindsight" in biotechnology obviousness determinations \[[@R27]\].

Finally, the Supreme Court seems to believe that the imposition of a more flexible approach will be more likely to benefit markets not directly at issue in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* The Supreme Court asserted, "\[t\]he diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels against limiting the analysis" to the rigid TSM test of the Federal Circuit \[[@R28]\]. This language suggests that the Supreme Court expects lower courts to take into consideration the special considerations facing unique markets, such as the biotechnology market. As such, the specific concerns of the biotechnology market discussed above may receive more attention under the flexible framework asserted by the Supreme Court in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*

Leading up to the oral argument in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, there was widespread speculation that the case could result in a watershed moment, significantly altering the definition of obviousness in patent law. For many, including those in the biotechnology industry, there was ample reason to be concerned. Any change in the definition of obviousness would effectively shift property rights from new patent holders to old, or vice versa. However, the Supreme Court acted with restraint. While the decision purports to make substantial changes by doing away with the Federal Circuit's TSM test, the opinion seems more like a mild-mannered rebuke of lower courts that had become too complacent in the implementation of their beloved test. If anything, the Supreme Court's insistence on a more flexible formula is simply a call for lower courts to employ common sense, in addition to considering the factors from *Graham* and the TSM test. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's opinion in *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.* is unlikely to have a pronounced effect on the biotechnology market, despite the widespread concern generated before the actual decision was handed down.
